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on State and Local Governments
Dick Netzer*
The essence of any serious program of federal tax simplification is
the same today as it was when Pechman first broached the idea more
than 30 years ago: include as taxable income a larger share of economic
income and subject that broader base to much lower marginal rates of
tax. The lower marginal rates themselves will reduce the relative attrac-
tiveness of whatever tax shelters remain. As part of the base broadening,
nearly all federal tax reform plans would narrow--in some cases elimi-
nate--deductibility of state and local taxes. These proposals are an ex-
tension of a trend that began with the exclusion of excises and license
taxes in 1964, extended to gasoline taxes in 1978 and was seriously con-
sidered for the sales tax in the debate that led to TEFRA in 1982. Current
tax reform plans also either eliminate tax-exempt borrowing or restrict it
by removing tax exemption from some types of borrowing.
The Deductibility of State and Local Taxes
Eliminating or substantially restricting deductibility raises the net
costs of state-local taxes to itemizers; if their voice is politically effective,
there should be some reduction in the revenue raised by currently de-
ductible taxes, especially in the states with relatively high tax rates, with
possible effects on the level of state-local spending and on the structure
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of state-local revenue systems. If their voice is ineffective, there should
be, in the long run, an impact on the location of economic activity,
because net interstate tax differentials will be higher than they were
before deductibility was reduced or eliminated.
The Rationale for Deductibility
At one extreme, if all taxes imposed by state and local governments
are used to buy either ordinary private goods that happen in some
places to be provided by something called a unit of government (per-
haps in large part so provided simply because of federal income tax de-
ductibility) or what are sometimes called "club goods," then deductibility
is both inequitable horizontally and inefficient, as an inducement to
overspend on some goods and services, with possible inefficiencies in
the location of economic activity. Even apart from deductibility’s effect
on the distribution of tax burdens by income class, no case could be
made for it, and all the consequences of its removal would be to the
good.
At the other extreme, if all the proceeds from currently deductible
taxes were used to finance pure public goods, then each individual’s
taxes are involuntary payments not attached to any specific benefits to
that individual, and therefore reduce his or her ability to pay income
taxes. Pure public goods do generate benefits but those benefits are
unrelated to the taxes paid to finance them and must be disregarded in
comparing the relative taxpaying ability of individuals and households.
Thus, taxable income should be measured net of these taxes. The only
hitch in this argument is that public goods do confer benefits over differ-
ent geographic areas. If the benefits stop at the state lines, then there is
no case for the federal government to recognize state and local taxes as
an impediment on ability to pay, since all federal taxpayers within the
state, as a group, have benefits that offset the taxes paid. Federal deduct-
ibility, under the circumstances assumed, would treat taxpayers with the
same net ability to pay differently in different states. Federal recognition
of the impact of state and local taxes on ability to pay therefore should
extend, in an ideal fiscal system, only to taxes imposed to finance public
goods whose benefits spill over state lines.
This equity argument is mirrored on the efficiency side: public
goods provided by the state-local sector that have significant positive
externalities (external to the state providing) will be under-supplied in
the absence of a federal subsidy for their provision. The trouble with this
proposition is that the "transfer efficiency" of deductibility of taxes as a
subsidy is exceedingly low. This is because the state and local govern-
ments gain revenue only to the extent that voters are willing to bear
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of one dollar of tax payments to something less than one dollar. If the
price elasticity of demand for state-local expenditure is -0.5 (a widely
used figure that many now believe to be on the high side), the marginal
tax rate of itemizers is 30 percent and itemizers are decisive in state-local
decision making, then state-local revenue will be increased by 15 cents
for each 30-cent loss in federal revenue. If itemizers are not decisive, the
figure will be much lower.
If the transfer efficiency is that low, then it would take a relatively
small increase in federal matching grants for specific purposes1 to offset
the loss in allocational efficiency--the under-supplying of state-local
public goods with benefit spillovers--that eliminating deductibility
would cause, even if those spillovers loomed large in state-local spend-
ing. They probably do not, however, even in the most generous of esti-
mates. At least one-third of spending financed from state-local tax
revenue is for public safety, transportation, local environmental services
and general government administration, a mixture of private goods and
public goods with few if any interstate spillovers. About one-half is for
education, where surely spillovers account for far from 100 percent of
spending. The remaining one-sixth is for explicitly redistributive activi-
ties in health, welfare and housing, where the interstate spillovers may
be considerable (but even here there are private goods aspects). A high
estimate might be that interstate benefit spillovers are associated with
about 20 percent of state and local tax-financed expenditures (that is,
above and beyond the spillovers already presumably paid for from fed-
eral grants); a low estimate would set the figure at well below 10 percent.
Of course, for policy purposes, one must be concerned about
whether, at the margin, these percentages are different. The fiscal crises
of the 1970s in major cities and states, and their responses to reductions
in federal grants during the 1980s, suggest that redistributive expendi-
tures are seen as marginal at the state-local levels. If this is so, then the
extent of interstate benefit spillovers affected by the withdrawal of de-
ductibility may be considerable. So some subsidy, beyond present feder-
al grants, should be provided for state-local spending.
While some argue for discriminating among tax forms or disallow-
ing of one or the other of the currently deductible taxes, these arguments
are not very persuasive. In 1982, deductibility of sales taxes was under
attack in part on the ground that the payment of sales taxes involved
1 The grants literature makes it clear that matching categorical grants not only should
be, but actually are, far more stimulative of state-local spending than are unconditional
grants like general revenue sharing; for a review of that literature, see Gramlich (1977).
Oakland (1985) argues that the transfer efficiency of deductibility may be greater than that
of general revenue sharing. In contrast, Noto and Zimmerman (1983) consider general
revenue sharing to have the better of the argument, based on the observed "flypaper
effect," explored in Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979), which Oakland asserts may
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some degree of voluntary choice. But the difference in the degree of
volition among a broad-based sales tax, the property tax (one can buy or
rent a cheaper house) and the income tax (there is also the choice be-
tween work and leisure) seems far too insignificant to be an element in
tax policy-making. Differential treatment of the property tax with regard
to deductibility is closely connected with the polar views on the appro-
priate federal income tax treatment of owner-occupied housing: if one
sees favorable discrimination as all wrong, then deductibility of the
property tax should be removed, whatever is done with respect to other
state and local taxes. If one sees virtue in tax subsidies to owner-occu-
pied housing, then property tax deductibility should be retained, what-
ever is done with respect to other taxes.
Some case can be made for differential treatment of property tax
deductibility, aside from the owner-occupied-housing question. The
property tax is the province of local governments and a larger fraction of
local spending is for private goods and public goods whose benefits are
realized in small geographic areas than is the case for state governments.
Another reason for differential treatment of the property tax is connect-
ed with its incidence, which presumably is quite different from that of
state and local income and sales taxes.
Whatever the theoretical case may be, a powerful pragmatic argu-
ment can be made against differentiating among the tax forms: state and
local governments can offset the federal revenue effects by changing the
composition of their tax systems. To be sure, the shift might never com-
pletely undo the federal tax reform, but it could go a long way within a
few years. The question of the effects on the composition of state-local
revenue systems is treated further in a later section of the paper.
Effects on the Aggregate Level of Public Spending
The removal of deductibility, or its substantial narrowing, may low-
er after-tax incomes and raise the price of public spending financed from
previously deductible taxes. How large are the resulting income effects
and substitution effects likely to be?
A generally accepted estimate of the income elasticity for aggregate
state-local spending is + 0.6 or, alternatively, an increase in expenditure
of about nine cents for each one dollar increase in income (see Inman,
1979, and Gramlich, 1977). So, if state and local taxes had not been
deductible in 1982--and all other provisions of federal tax law had been
unchanged--after-tax personal income would have been $24.5 billion
lower, and state-local spending financed from own-source revenue
would have been about $2.2 billion lower.
The effect is not only small; it is also irrelevant to consideration of
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income effects are not irrelevant in considering the differential impact
among the states, although they will be small here too). The price effect
is the one of importance in this context. With the exception of a reform
plan that provides a threshold expressed as a percentage of adjusted
gross income, below which state-local taxes are not deductible, all other
proposals for limiting deductibility raise the net cost, at the margin, of
state-local tax payments to those who claim itemized deductions, and
thus have a price effect.
Accepting -0.5 as an uneasy consensus on price elasticity, the next
question is the size of the price change. In theory, that should be the
price increase confronting the median voter; if the median voter is an
itemizer, it is the marginal tax rate for the voter divided by the present
price, one minus the marginal tax rate. If the median voter is not an
itemizer, prices do not increase at all. The data allow us to estimate the
marginal tax rate for itemizers by income class and by state, but it is not
clear just how to identify the median voter. Kenyon (1985) places that
voter in the $25,000 to $30,000 range of adjusted gross income for 1982,
on the basis of Census data on voting by income level. She then calcu-
lates a weighted price for state-local services financed by deductible tax-
es of .85, in the income class containing the median voter. Thus,
elimination of deductibility would raise the price by about 18 percent.
If the price elasticity is -0.5, then state-local tax rate reduction in
response to voter pressure should in time reduce by 9 percent the rev-
enue from taxes that are currently deductible. Or, if the uncompensated
price elasticity is -0.5 and the compensated price elasticity therefore
- 0.4 (with an income elasticity coefficient of + 0.6 and state-local spend-
ing at 10 percent of aggregate income), that revenue will decline by
about 7 percent. But this revenue finances only a fraction of total state-
local government spending--about 27 percent in 1982-83. So the expect-
ed decline in total state-local spending from all sources of revenue is a bit
less than 2 percent--and it would be a good deal lower if the "correct"
price elasticity is significantly lower than a (compensated) -0.4. It
would also be lower if voters decided to increase nondeductible revenue
sources to partially compensate for the loss of deductible revenues.2
Thus, the effect on the aggregate level of state-local spending from
the ending of deductibility is likely to be very small (and smaller still if
deductibility is narrowed, rather than ended entirely). Given that the
additional spending induced by the presence of deductibility is in part in
the form of private goods and wholly local public goods--which is both
inefficient and horizontally inequitable--there seems very little basis to
argue for continuation of deductibility from the standpoint of the aggre-
2 Inman’s 1985 paper finds substantial degrees of both complementarity and substitu-
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gate level of public spending. If there is a case for deductibility, it must
be based on the national interest, if any, in the composition of the rev-
enue systems of state and local governments and/or the national interest
in the interjurisdictional disparities in the effects of ending deductibility.
The Structure of State-Local Revenue Systems
It is likely that the existence of deductibility has encouraged state
and local governments to rely more heavily on deductible personal taxes
than on alternative revenue sources, including user charges, non-
deductible taxes paid by households (mainly selective excises) and taxes
paid by businesses (which will remain deductible in any conceivable tax
reform plan). Therefore, we might expect the end of deductibility to
foster a shift to those other revenue sources.
Increased use of selective excises seems the least likely of these
possibilities, because the most popular objects of such excises--alcoholic
beverages, cigarettes, motor fuel and (at the local government level)
public utilities gross receipts--usually are subject to high rates of tax
already.3 Conceivably, the end of deductibility might reduce the opposi-
tion to higher rates of taxation of motor fuel in some states (although the
post-1973 experience should convince us that the political decision-
makers believe that low taxes on gasoline have the appeal in most states
that rent control has in New York, Cambridge and Santa Monica), and
perhaps some new "demerit good" with price-inelastic demand (legal
marijuana?) in the future may attract excise taxation. But these seem
unlikely and minor occurrences.
Increased reliance on user charges would be welcomed by most
analysts, if the user charges were properly designed. However, if we
look beyond New England, user charges already finance a considerable
share of expenditures for private goods provided through state and local
governments, with the non-trivial exceptions of education (at all levels),
public transportation (the only service for which the share of finance
coming from user charges has declined since 1970), and local expendi-
ture for roads and streets. For example, local government costs for sew-
erage are now wholly user-charge-financed, a big change from 20 years
ago, and user-charge financing (and privatization) have increased for
refuse collection and disposal.4 Although the easy opportunities for user
charge financing have generally been taken already (even Boston and
8 As of 1982, combined federal-state-local selective sales tax revenue amounted to the
following percentages of the dollar volume of sales (measured variously) excluding those
taxes: motor fuel, about 13 percent; alcoholic beverages, about 21 percent; tobacco prod-
ucts, about 37 percent; and electric, gas and telephone utility sales, about 4 percent. Calcu-
lated from NIPA, Statistical Abstract and Census of Governments data.
4 For a discussion of the change in reliance on user charges by local governments
during the 1970s, see Netzer (1983).228 Dick Netz~r
New York no longer subsidize water supply, as they did until a few years
ago), the elimination of deductibility should make some of the more
difficult opportunities more attractive.
One difficulty here is that the potential efficiency advantages of user
charges depend entirely upon proper design. Conventional user-charge
designs---flat transit fares, admission charges to facilities and events
with considerable unused capacity, uniform all-hour tolls on bridges,
motor vehicle registration fees as highway-user charges, for example--
can be less efficient than general taxes. Unconventional designs seem
hard to sell, even to sophisticated politicians, and marginal cost pricing
does not seem to mix well with populism, especially populism of the
right.
A likely response to the elimination of deductibility of taxes paid by
households would be a shift to taxes paid by businesses, which remain
deductible, although the shift will be contained by worries about ad-
verse effects on economic development. Increased state corporate in-
come tax rates and narrowing of various tax-reducing features would be
one response. Another would be to sweep more intermediate business
purchases into the net of the general sales tax (in concept, one of the
most unneutral tax actions possible, although the quantitative effects
overall may be small).
No doubt, the movement toward classification in the property tax
would be encouraged. As of the 1982 Census of Governments, 17 states
and the District of Columbia had formal constitutional or statutory pro-
visions for taxing different classes of real property at different effective
rates, in all or some parts of the state. Business property is almost always
in the higher effective rate classifications. Most of these provisions were
adopted within the last decade, as part of the response by homeowning
voters to the combination of rapid increases in housing prices and im-
proved assessment administration. An alternative, of long tradition in a
few states in the south, would be to provide very large homestead ex-
emptions, such that the tax base was reduced essentially to business
property.
The elimination of deductibility also could result in shifts in relative
reliance among the state and local deductible taxes and in changes in the
specific features of those taxes. Most important are state and local in-
come taxes. About half of the dollar amount of the total deductions for
taxes paid is for individual income tax payments, and well over half the
U.S. Treasury’s revenue loss due to state-local tax deductibility is attrib-
utable to income taxes alone.5 Moreover, recent empirical work by
Kenyon (1985) and Inman (1985) finds that residents’ savings from de-
ductibility are an important determinant of a state or local government’s
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dependence on income taxes. This implies that the loss of deductibility
is likely to significantly reduce reliance on personal income taxes.
If the elimination of deductibility does lead to a major movement to
reduce the importance of individual income taxes in the state-local tax
structure, this will be a sharp reversal of a major, but largely unre-
marked, trend over the past 20 years or so. Most of us are familiar with
the observations that the state-local sector relies a lot less on own-source
revenue than it did 20 years ago (although more than it did at the peak in
federal aid in 1978); that nontax revenue has increased somewhat more
than tax revenue; and that, within the tax component, the role of the
property tax has decreased sharply. There has been less commentary,
however, about the role of individual income taxes per se.
Between 1962 and 1982-83 (using Census Bureau data here), the




Individual income 7.3 19.4
Corporate income 3.1 5.0
General sales 14.5 22.8
Selective sales 18.0 12.4
All other 11.2 9.0
Thus, the relative role of the consumption taxes as a group has changed
very little; selective sales taxes declined in importance while general
sales taxes increased, a result consistent with the ending of deductibility
of the former between 1962 and 1982-83. The real change was the dis-
placement of the property tax by the individual income tax, mostly as a
result of deliberate choices to shift from local taxation, largely based on
the property tax, to state government taxation, based on other sources.
The increase in the individual income tax percentage was a result of new
adoptions of the tax; increases in the rates of many existing taxes (not
consistently, for the period was marked by numerous rate reductions as
well as rate increases); and the rapid growth of money income, with tax
structures usually quite good at capturing that growth. At the state gov-
ernment level, the individual income tax increased from 13.3 percent of
total tax revenue in 1962 to 29.0 percent in 1982-83, for all states com-
bined. Moreover, the increase in reliance on the individual income tax
was widespread, not concentrated in a few states (although 11 states
continue to have no general income tax).
One obvious way to mitigate the elimination of deductibility for
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structure (or its equivalent in exemptions and credits). However, to
avoid a loss of revenue, states will have to raise taxes for some taxpay-
ers, presumably those who do not itemize now and who therefore will
not lose from the elimination of deductibility. Not only will this be un-
popular (itemizers in 1982 accounted for fewer than 50 percent of federal
taxpayers in all but five states, according to the data in Kenyon, 1985),
but it also will reduce the responsive of tax revenue to growth in money
income.
To some extent, rate reduction can occur without revenue loss in
those states whose income tax base is tied to the federal definitions of
taxable income, because the state’s own income tax base will expand
automatically. Thirty-five of the 39 income tax states have such linkages,
in one form or another.
In short, the one quantitatively important effect on the state-local
revenue structure that is highly likely to occur is lesser dependence on
state income taxes as part of the revenue system of the sector as a whole,
and probably some flattening of income tax rates.
The National Interest in the State-Local Revenue System. Does it really
matter, to the country at large, if the states revise their revenue systems
as this analysis suggests? The general answer is yes.
First, if user charges are substituted for currently deductible taxes to
finance services with private-goods characteristics, the country will be
better off if the new user charges are at all sensible in design. There will
be efficiency gains, and most of us would argue that any real equity
changes are likely to be to the good, with less subsidizing of well-off
users by poorer non-users.
Second, greater reliance on selective excises seems not in the na-
tional interest. The efficiency losses from taxes with a narrow base and
considerable potential for substitutability are greater than the dead-
weight losses from broader-based taxes, quite apart from questions
about the costs of administration. (Administrative costs are very low for
public utilities taxes but far from trivial for the other selective excises, if a
high order of compliance is the target.) Few still believe that consump-
tion of motor fuel and public utility services is price-inelastic.
Third, public finance economists do not think much of state and
local business taxes. Both are typically replete with provisions that are
unneutral in effect with respect to sectors, inputs and location. Hence,
greater use of this revenue source would not be expected to improve the
efficiency of the national tax system. The only countervailing possibility
is that the political desire to shift the tax burden to business might lead
the states to adopt value-added taxes in place of existing business taxes.
A value-added tax would generate substantial additional revenue and
permit reductions in the currently deductible personal taxes. Since a
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sumption in that state, it might be easier to sell. The neutrality attributes
of value-added taxation afford efficiency gains.
Fourth, from the national perspective, a reduction in the use of
property taxation should reduce the progressivity of the national tax
system. The effect should be quite small, but if the tax simplification
plan adopted is really intended to be distributionally neutral, like Trea-
sury I, that effect might be considered a drawback. The ideal property
tax, from the standpoint of efficiency, is one that is completely uniform,
not only across jurisdictions, but across types of assets. Therefore, if the
end of deductibility promotes more differential taxation of types of as-
sets, that is, shifts the burden from housing to business-owned assets, it
is also promoting some loss in efficiency. That shift may be the most
likely response to the elimination of deductibility, and the dollar
amounts could be large over time.
The overall conclusion here is that from the national standpoint, the
end of deductibility may create more losses than gains in the revenue
structure; this negative balance stems from the likelihood that dumping
property taxes on business will be a widespread response. The losses are
not huge, but even so make a case for the narrowing, rather than elimi-
nation, of deductibility.
Interjurisdictional Variation in Effects
In political terms, the disparities in impact among the states consti-
tute the most important effects of ending deductibility. Within the con-
text of a federal revenue-neutral tax reform, the elimination of
deductibility will result in substantial transfers among federal taxpayers
in different states.
The reason for the disparate effects is of course the variation in the
ratio of state and local taxes to income. Total state-local tax revenue in
1982-83 ranged from 8.9 percent of personal income in New Hampshire
to 15.3 percent in New York, with the median at 10.5 percent (this ex-
cludes two outliers, Alaska and Wyoming, with their huge revenue from
severance taxes on resource extraction). However, the range for deduct-
ible personal taxes is considerably greater than the range for all state and
local taxes combined.6 The variation is especially great for high-income
households.
Kenyon (1985) gives the distribution of states by net gains and
losses per capita as follows (again, excluding Alaska and Wyoming):
6 There is less variation in corporate income tax rates than there is in personal income
tax rates among the states, and a few of the states without personal income taxes do have
corporate taxes. Moreover, property tax exemptions and classification schemes produce a
higher order of interstate variation in effective rates of property taxes on owner-occupied
housing than on the less favored types of property.232 Dick Netzer
Estimated Net Changes in Federal Tax Liability for 1982
with End of Deductibility
Number of States with





75 or more 1 1
Totals 32 17
On a per capita basis for the country as a whole, potentially deductible
state-local taxes in 1982-83 amounted to $657, and total state-local tax
revenue to $1,216. It would not be difficult for those states with a net
saving or loss of less than $25 per capita to offset the aggregate federal
tax change for their residents by changing state tax provisions. But for 10
states the net loss to resident taxpayers is not at all trivial, and for 15
states the net gain will be seen as very worthwhile.
Is it a matter of national concern that New Yorkers lose $2.0 billion
($115 per capita) from the elimination of deductibility and attendant rate
reduction while Texans gain $1.3 billion ($84 per capita)?7 It clearly
would be in the national interest for such a transfer to take place if the
current deductibility amounts to a subsidy to New Yorkers--paid by
Texans and others in the 34 states that now lose net from deductibility--
to spend extravagantly on services with no benefit outside the state’s
boundaries, or simply to pay high salaries to a swollen civil service. Are
those the facts?
It is difficult to tell from the data at hand. Superficially, table I seems
to support the opponents of deductibility. Residents of 13 states and the
District of Columbia will lose substantially from the ending of deduct-
ibility. In 1982-83 per capita state-local expenditure financed from tax
revenue in these states was $387 more, or 40 percent higher, than tax-
financed expenditure in the rest of the states. Of the differential, about
30 percent was accounted for by the lesser proportionate use of nontax
revenue. Employment-related variables--staffing relative to population,
public employee compensation levels, and employee retirement spend-
ing--together accounted for 35 percent of the differential, and spending
for welfare, net of federal aid, accounted for another 18 percent. The
remaining one-sixth of the differential was accounted for by a variety of
7 It should be kept in mind that this analysis ignores the other aspects of federal tax
reform plans. It has been estimated that New York residents will gain, net, from Treasury
II--which is not revenue-neutral with respect to the individual income tax--about $31 per
capita in 1987, although the gain for New Yorkers is proportionally far below the national
average. New York State Special Deputy Comptroller (1985).STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 233
Table 1
Analysis of Differences in State-Local E2penditure Per Capita between Statesa
Whose Residents Lose Significantly from the Ending of Deductibility and All Other
States, 1982-83:
Total per capita difference in state-local expenditure, less federal aid $517
Less: Per capita expenditure financed from nontax revenue from own sources 130
Equals: Additional per capita expenditure financed from state-local tax revenue $387
Causes of additional expenditures from state-local tax revenue (in per capita amounts):
Lesser use, proportionally, of nontax revenueb $118
Higher number of employees in relation to populationc
Higher salaries per employeed




Higher expenditure for public welfare, net of federal aid for welfare 70
Other causes, net 63
$387
a The states whose residents would have lost more than $10 per capita in 1982, without deductibility, in
descending order: New York, Maryland, Minnesota, the District of Columb!a, Delaware, Wisconsin, Michi-
gan, California, Massachusetts, Oregon, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Utah and Hawaii.
b Nontax revenue accounted for 23.8 percent of total expenditure less federal aid for the losing states
and 29.5 percent for the other states.
c Employees per 1,000 population were about 3.5 percent higher in the losing states than in the other
states.
d Wages and salaries per fuIMime equivalent employee averaged $21,325 in the losing states and
$17,403 in the other states.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Governments Division, 1982-83 data.
other expenditures, including interest on debt and transfer payments
not classified under the welfare function.
So, close to two-thirds of the differential is explained by factors that
may involve discretionary action by state and local decisionmakers--the
decision not to rely much on user charges, as in Massachusetts; the
decision to staff extravagantly, as in the District of Columbia; the deci-
sion to pay high salaries, also in the District; past decisions that produce
generous employee pension plans, once again in the District. But things
are not that simple. The mix of expenditure--and the allocation of re-
sponsibilities between the public and private sectors--very much affect
the use of nontax revenue sources. Most of these states have no major
public power operations, an important generator of nontax revenue. It
hardly is consistent with the argument against deductibility to assert
that the states without public power systems "over-tax" because the data
for them show less reliance on user charges. On the other hand, in
numerous cases a feasible choice for user charges rather than taxes has
been rejected--as is so characteristic of New England--and deductibil-
ity encourages that uneconomic decision.234 Dick Netzer
Similarly, the level of expenditure for personal services is partly a
matter of choice, partly a matter of pressures that politicians have no
power to ignore, such as court orders and other federal requirements
with respect to prisons, mental hospitals, and special education; region-
al differences in wage rates and living costs; and the accident of being
the point of entry for large numbers of immigrants (California and New
York). The same considerations apply to spending for welfare purposes:
there is an element of choice, but discretion is less than complete unless
the public and officials are prepared to tolerate very high levels of dis-
tress indeed. To be sure, in the long run, substantially lower levels of
spending for what now seems socially necessary purposes in the high
spending states will produce migration of problem populations to other
states: a harsher prison regime will affect the distribution of miscreants;
a more porous safety net will speed the dispersion of immigrants away
from the initial points of entry.
During the past 15 years, there have been numerous budgetary
"crises" in the state-local sector, some clearly cyclical (and thus amenable
to solution by various short-term expedients), but some--especially in
economically weak places--evidently of a secular nature, requiring a
lower level of spending in the absence of rescue from without (and
perhaps even with such a rescue, as occurred in the New York City fiscal
crisis of 1975). What expenditure has been reduced in these crisis situa-
tions? Almost invariably, there has been a reduction in labor costs in real
terms, some combination of reductions in real wages and reductions in
staffing. The reductions in staffing usually have been sharpest in con-
nection with social services and education. Also, states in crisis have
frequently reduced the level of public assistance payments in real terms,
and restricted the scope of and eligibility for various social services.
It is not necessarily the case that the reduction in staffing reduced,
proportionately, the level of social and educational services provided--
and thus the extent of redistribution through public spending--but the
pattern suggests that officials and voters saw the pre-crisis package of
public spending in a way that gives some support to deductibility. There
was a slice of the spending that was a very private good indeed--excess
wages to public employees in that jurisdiction, which could be eliminat-
ed. There was another slice, protective services, whose benefits were
perceived as equal to at least 100 cents on the tax dollar, that should be
cut as little as possible. And there was a large slice of redistributive
spending, with benefits to median voters well below 100 cents on the tax
dollar, to be cut substantially. Presumably, the sudden, large downward
pressure on expenditure that would be caused by the end of deductibil-
ity in high tax areas would result in a similar pattern of spending reduc-
tions, with itemizers viewing social services and other redistributive
activities as being of low benefit to them.STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 235
If, as seems to be the case, the redistribution branch (to use the
Musgrave terminology) is especially large in the high-tax states, then
deductibility can be supported on the ground that the high taxes are not
simply a result of local political decisions in which there is no national
interest. Instead, deductibility is a subsidy for redistribution that is ap-
propriate, given the probable absence during the next few years of feder-
al grant aid to support redistributive spending at the state-local level that
is now financed from state-local taxes. However, this position is by no
means unchallenged in the public finance literature. Gramlich and
Rubinfeld (1982) found a pro-rich bias in public spending in Michigan,
which may be characteristic of some other high-tax states and which is
compounded by federal tax deductibility.
Redistributive expenditure is not the only aspect of the national
interest that is at issue in connection with the interjurisdictional effects
of ending deductibility. With the end of deductibility, the absolute mag-
nitudes of differential interjurisdictional tax burdens are likely to rise
sharply, and that should produce some locational shifts over time. The
shifts might be especially pronounced if political pressures lead the
states to substitute ~business taxes for currently deductible personal
taxes. 8
In theory, the country will be better off, not worse off, from the
migration that follows the elimination of deductibility, if the principal
effect of deductibility had been to lower the tax price of entirely local or
private goods. In that case, deductibility surely was encouraging people
to locate inefficiently. If, on the other hand, externalities and redistribu-
tion loom large in the present pattern of gross differentials in state-local
taxes, the migration that will be induced by the ending of deductibility
will be inefficient.
Kenyon (1985) has a useful hypothetical illustration of the migration
question, reproduced in table 2. She puts the question in terms of how
residents perceive the value of benefits from net local tax payments,
with a low ratio of benefit value to tax payments an indication of ineffi-
ciency in government production and of the presence of externalities.
An alternative formulation would include all redistributive expenditure
in the zero-benefit category (for itemizers), as well as "defensive" expen-
ditures that are designed to make a city as tolerable for itemizers as
competitive locations. (High-income taxpayers in most large central
cities probably view a large fraction of their state-local tax payments as
a Note that the locational effects need not be restricted to the states whose residents as
a whole are net losers from the end of deductibility. The end of deductibility will widen
the differentials in state-local tax burdens as such; the lower marginal rates of the federal
income tax may offset the end of deductibility for any individual, but those lower marginal
rates are available anywhere in the country, so migration to avoid high state-local taxes
makes sense regardless of the net federal tax liability change.Table 2




CASE 1: Perceived Benefits = 1/4 Taxes
High-Tax City $12,000 $9,000
Low-Tax City $ 8,000 $6,000
CASE 2: Perceived Benefits = 1/2 Taxes
High-Tax City $12,000 $9,000
Low-Tax City $ 8,000 $6,000
CASE 3: Perceived Benefits = 3/4 Taxes
High-Tax City $12,000 $9,000
Low-Tax City $ 8,000 $6,000
CASE 4: Perceived Benefits = Taxes
High-Tax City $12,000 $9,000
Low-Tax City $ 8,000 $6,000
a Tax and benefit levels are assumed. A federal marginal tax rate of
Source: Reproduced from Kenyon (1985).
(3) (4) (5)
Perceived




$3,000 incentive to move from
high-tax to low-tax city
$ 6,000
$ 4,000
$2,000 incentive to move from
high-tax to low-tax city
$ 9,00O
$ 6,000
$1,000 incentive to move from
high-tax to low-tax city
$12,000
$ 8,000
No incentive for migration
25% is also assumed.
$2,009 incentive to move from
high-tax to low-tax city
$1,000 incentive to move from
high-tax to low-tax city
No incentive for migration
$1,000 incentive to move from
low-tax to high-tax citySTATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 237
producing zero benefits in these senses.)
If Case 4 is a good description of the real world of state-local fi-
nance, then deductibility’s influence on location is entirely pernicious:
people have an incentive to move to a high-tax location to receive bene-
fits at a below-cost tax price. If the real world is like Case 1, and the gap
between the value of benefits and taxes is largely due to externalities and
redistribution, then the elimination of deductibility would increase the
existing incentive for inefficent locational shifts.
Opinion among public finance economists, like opinion generally,
has shifted to the right in recent years. A few years ago, there was little
doubt expressed in the literature that a substantial part of the disparities
in taxes and spending was connected with the composition of the popu-
lation and the consequent redistributive aspect of state-local finance. In
a classic article in 1974, Bradford and Oates explored the consequences,
in theory and empirically for northeastern New Jersey, of consolidating
all local governments in a large metropolitan area into a single unified
government. They predicted substantial inefficencies in a Tiebout sense,
a good deal of income redistribution and a pronounced locational effect;
that is, reduction of the incentive of the affluent to move to income-
segregated suburbs to escape taxation for redistributive purposes. This
was consistent with the findings in the literature of urban economics
that large U.S. metropolitan areas were a good deal more decentralized
than would be predicted by nonfiscal variables alone. If Bradford and
Oates had included the elimination of deductibility as one of their sce-
narios, they surely would have predicted an exacerbation of the incen-
tive for the affluent to shift to income-segregated communities, and they
would have seen this both as a consequential loss in equity and as loca-
tionally inefficient.
The literature of the past dozen or so years sees multilevel public
finance rather differently. As summarized succinctly by Gramlich
(1985a), subnational governments play a useful role in the economic
stabilization branch; income redistribution is best done at the local level,
on the whole, although Gramlich himself argues that long-term inter-
state migration and the existing large disparities in public assistance
levels argue for a direct federal income support system. In the allocation
branch, the present division of functions does closely match the nature
of the benefits generated by the various functions. The last position is
based on viewing elementary and secondary education as generating
little other than private benefits to children and their parents. If the
present distribution of responsibilities among the levels of government
is close to right, and the system of grants from the federal government to
the state and local governments not too defective, then the subsidy in
deductibility has no positive merits to offset its demerits as an inefficient
stimulus to overspending on public services without positive spillovers.238 Dick Netzer
In effect, it serves as a gift to high-income people and an inducement to
inefficent patterns of residential location; it is, to use Gramlich’s adjec-
tive, pernicious.
About 65 percent of deductible taxes are paid to state, not local,
governments, and state individual income and retail sales taxes surely
are very far from being wholly or largely benefit taxes. If deductibility
could be restricted to residents of large central cities and other low-
income places (as proposed in Gramlich 1985b), then there would be
only efficient locational effects. But this is perhaps the most unlikely of
political outcomes.
One final point can be made about the interjurisdictional effects,
this one political, not economic. The American federal system works on
the basis of simultaneous interregional bargaining over many points; the
bargaining is continuous and depends on the current positions. The
inflicting of large windfall losses on particular states or regions does not
fit this bargaining pattern: the fact that some places did well in the past
because of a set of arrangements that are now seen as poorly conceived
has never justified reversing those arrangements, if only because the
people who will lose today are not those who gained in the past, be-
cause of both mortality and mobility. Perhaps the classic example is
federal policy with respect to Western water resource development and
the distribution of federal water. In comparison with the inefficiencies
and inequities in these policies, state-local tax deductibility is Pareto-
optimal. Those inefficiencies and inequities are now widely recognized,
but the policies have not been reversed, only slowly and marginally
modified; reversal and the windfall losses associated with reversal strike
most Americans, not only real property owners in the arid West (the
winners from past federal policies), as unfair and inconsistent with the
politics of our federalism. The complete elimination of deductibility
would be of that political character.
This argument appears, in more formal terms, in Hochman (1973):
fiscal institutions tend to be capitalized and reversal of longstanding
practices can lead to haphazard patterns of gains and losses, perhaps
more harmful socially and politically than the ills that were to be correct-
ed by the reform in question. As Hochman put it recently (in a comment
on an earlier version of this paper):
The tax code is but one aspect of Federal law; but it was not a painting
created in isolation. All of the other legislation that affects state and local
relations and defines the federal system, etc., was enacted under some
assumptions, perhaps implicit, about the tax code, the constitution, etc.
While this is an argument against any non-incremental reform of
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of which (in Treasury II) is a drastic change in the system of fiscal federal-
ism and the balance of interregional relations. Treasury II is incremental
in virtually every other feature (for example, taxability of fringe bene-
fits); it is radical when it deals with the federal structure.
Conclusions on Deductibility
It is both attractive and useful to view the finances of state and local
governments as if they were all manifestations of a Tiebout world, in
which state-local taxes are the equivalent of prices paid through volun-
tary exchange in markets and locational choice is the process through
which these markets are cleared. A great deal of worthwhile analysis has
flowed from that construct. If we use the construct, then there is no
argument at all for tax deductibility (other than the political one in the
preceding paragraph): deductibility inefficiently increases aggregate
spending, induces state and local governments to use the revenue in-
struments that they would otherwise disdain (in particular, steeply
graduated personal income taxes), and provides incentives for ineffi-
cient locational patterns (in particular, encouraging high-income people
to live in high-tax jurisdictions). But in a world with externalities and
redistribution at the state-local level and long-established institutions
and practices, the argument must change.
It does not change greatly with respect to the effect on the aggregate
level of state-local spending. The elimination of deductibility might
cause some loss in spending for externalities and redistribution, but
since the total effect would be so small--a reduction of less than 2 per-
cent of total spending--the efficiency and equity losses on this score
must be trivial.
The effects of deductibility, or its elimination, on the revenue struc-
ture of the state-local sector are in practice somewhat equivocal. Elimina-
tion would marginally encourage substitution of user charges for
personal taxes, an efficient result if the charges are properly designed
but not if they are the conventional clumsy lot. There would also be an
inducement to substitute business taxes for personal taxes, which is
probably undesirable, and to rely more on selective sales taxes that are
not now deductible, which is even less desirable. Reduced reliance on
the property tax would lower the progressivity of the national tax sys-
tem, as would reduced reliance on state-local personal income taxation
(how much depends on the actual form of the tax cuts that state and
local governments make). So, the likely revenue structure effects are
mostly undesirable, although perhaps not strongly so.
The interjurisdictional effects in the real world are harder to ap-
praise. Based on the view that the non-Tiebout aspects of the finances of
the states and of large central cities predominate for those units, I con-240 Dick Netzer
clude that the losses from complete elimination of deductibility will ex-
ceed the gains, in regard to interjurisdictional effects. Together, these
conclusions suggest restricting, rather than eliminating, deductibility:
raising tax prices, but not to 100 cents on the dollar (for example, by only
permitting the deduction of some fraction, not 100 percent, of personal
taxes paid), and also employing a threshold--appropriate for any per-
sonal deduction alleged to be provided in order to refine the measure-
ment of ability to pay, including charitable contributions.
Exemption from Taxation of Interest on State and Local
Bonds
If after tax revision the interest on some debt obligations of state and
local governments continues to be exempt from federal taxation, the
lower marginal rates will reduce the value of the exemption to holders of
the debt, thus making them less likely to buy such obligations unless
their yields rise relative to yields on taxable obligations. Although the
efficiency and equity costs of tax-exempt borrowing seem a good deal
higher than those of deductibility of state and local taxes, complete
elimination of deductibility is more popular in current tax reform plans
than is complete elimination of tax-exempt borrowing.
The Demand for Municipals
If the only change in the federal income tax being contemplated
were to reduce the top marginal rates to 35 percent for individuals and
33 percent for corporations, there should be some reduction in the de-
mand for tax-exempt fixed-income securities and--if the supply is un-
changed-an increase in yields.9 Nevertheless, demand should not
collapse, under the conditions that have prevailed for most of the past 15
years, during which time the spread between yields on similar long-term
tax-exempt and taxable bonds generally has been less than 30 percent.
At a 30 percent spread, the tax-exempt bond continues to offer a higher
net yield than a taxable bond, even after top marginal rates are reduced
to 35 and 33 percent.
However, interest costs to state and local governments over time
will be higher for several reasons. First, average rates relative to taxable
securities must be somewhat higher over the years than they have been
in the past, since we would be unlikely to experience again periods
9 An excellent summary of the likely effects of the proposed changes in the treatment
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when the spread was greater than 35 percent. Second, the spread on
short-term borrowing has been 40 percent or more for most of the past
15 years, so the cost of short-term tax-exempt borrowing surely will
increase.
The third reason is a bit less obvious. Up to this point, the assump-
tion has been that the investor’s decision is confined to the choice be-
tween taxable and tax-exempt fixed-income securities of similar quality.
But of course investors’ choices and investment objectives range more
widely. There are questions about liquidity, risk and the opportunity for
capital appreciation, in addition to considerations of current after-tax
returns. Indeed, in well-functioning markets, the net return on munici-
pals should never be greater or less than the net return on equivalent-
quality taxable bonds, unless investors are acting on these other
considerations. With lower marginal rates, one might expect tax-exempt
obligations to be less attractive relative to some other types of in-
vestments.
The reduction in marginal rates is by no means the only feature of
tax simplification plans that would affect the demand for municipals.
Treasury I and II both propose that commercial banks no longer be per-
mitted to deduct interest paid to finance the carrying of tax-exempt secu-
rities (since 1984, only 80 percent of those costs have been deductible).
That might substantially reduce commercial banks’ willingness to hold
municipals, and thus lead to increases in yields for the maturities fa-
vored by commercial banks.
Other features will work to increase the demand for tax-exempt
obligations. As other tax shelters are closed down, demand will shift to
those that continue to operate. The elimination of the investment tax
credit and changes in depreciation rules will work in this direction, espe-
cially through their effects on limited partnership and leasing deals. In
addition, if the maximum marginal tax rate on capital gains is reduced by
less than the marginal rate on ordinary income (as in Treasury II, a
reduction from 20 percent to 17.5 percent for capital gains), there should
be a marginal shift from investment for capital gain to investment for
current income, and that might spill over to municipals.
"Private-Purpose" Municipal Bonds
The principal effects on tax-exempt borrowing come in most pro-
posals from restrictions on the supply side, in the form of limits on the
types of new borrowing for which the interest will continue to be tax-
exempt. Most important are restrictions on advance refunding bonds
and prohibition of tax-exempt borrowing for "private purposes." Private
purpose is defined in Treasury I and II as use of more than 1 percent of
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local government, except where the facilities built are used by all mem-
bers of the general public on the same basis.
What those words would mean in practice is not at all clear, for in
some sense almost all state and local facilities are "used" mainly by pri-
vate parties--public schools by pupils, public hospitals by patients, jails
by prisoners, water and sewer lines by households and business estab-
lishments connected to the lines, transportation facilities by shippers
and passengers. Moreover, that use is seldom offered on precisely the
same basis for all members of the general public, for there is generally
some degree of inherent exclusivity which produces differentiation in
access: the first house on a single-family lot has the exclusive access to
the water and sewer lines passing in front of the house; school districts
usually allocate pupils to schools on the basis of residence; there may be
queuing for some types of hospital beds. Presumably, the tax reformers
do not aim to eliminate borrowing in any of these cases, but their targets
seem not all that different, taking the words of the definition literally.
The principal targets, according to Treasury I, are bonds for industrial
development, pollution control, student loans, nongovernmental hospi-
tals, multi-family housing and owner-occupied housing, which in 1983
accounted for 62 percent of the dollar volume of all new long-term tax-
exempt offerings. 10
The notion that some purposes for tax-exempt borrowing are essen-
tially "private," while other purposes are appropriately "public," calls for
some non-arbitrary dividing line between the two classes. It appears that
in most discussions the dividing line is based on some unarticulated
readings of history: state and local governments have "traditionally" per-
formed certain functions for which they often borrowed money, but
"traditionally" did not borrow money for all sorts of things that now
entail tax-exempt borrowing.
The trouble is that the historical record is full of examples of state-
local borrowing for what is now often called private-purpose tax-exempt
borrowing. As late as 1950, the states had very little debt for purposes
that are unequivocally public: about 30 percent of their outstanding debt
was for highways (highways usually have positive externalities only
because users rarely pay high enough charges); about 42 percent for
grants and loans to veterans (of which a large share went into the pur-
chase of single-family houses); and about 5 percent for other loans to
private parties, for housing and to farmers. Ten years later, with a huge
so ACIR (1984) contains a state-by-state listing by type for 1983, citing the Treasury as
the source. The interstate variation is considerable: in four states, these types of borrow-
ing amounted to less than 20 percent of all new long-term borrowing, while in four others
the percentage was 80 or more. Also the composition of "private-purpose" issues by type
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increase in state debt, 45 percent was for highways (mostly for toll
roads), 16 percent each for veterans, farm and housing credit and an-
other 8 percent for such "private purposes" as port facilities and electric
power plants. As late as 1970, such purposes accounted for about half of
state debt. Local governments too have a long history of borrowing for
purposes whose character is private in important ways. In 1863, New
York City borrowed for the most private of purposes: to pay the bounties
that could keep young men from being conscripted into the Union army.
By the late nineteenth century, city governments commonly were put-
ting in streets, sidewalks, street lighting and water and sewer lines--all
financed by borrowing--in close conjunction with subdividers’ plans for
new housing development on the edges of built-up areas. There was
substantial municipal borrowing for transit purposes--streetcar lines
and later rail systems in the biggest cities--with the facilities always
operated by private companies and often owned by them as well. Mu-
nicipal public utilities--in no way different from their private counter-
parts--were widespread by the turn of the century, in water supply,
electric power and gas. Until around 1950, utilities accounted for about
half of all municipal debt.
Another problem with the dividing line between public and private
purpose in the current discussions is that the Treasury and others seem
infatuated with the nominal ownership of the assets: If a governmental
entity is the owner and operator, then the borrowing may have a public
purpose; if a nongovernmental entity is the owner and operator, the
purpose must be private, regardless of the function carried out. But
governmental and nongovernmental ownership and operation are often
close substitutes, notably with regard to hospitals and education, where
historical accident very often has determined the extent to which there is
private provision by nonprofit organizations. Similar conditions of sub-
stitutability exist with regard to housing finance and a good many other
things.
This substitutability suggests that restrictions on tax-exempt bor-
rowing that rely primarily on the legal status of the entities involved will
be defeated by state legislation that redefines that status. Thus, Con-
gress will be compelled to list, in detail, permissible and impermissible
uses of funds borrowed under tax exemption. Presumably, there is noth-
ing constitutionally improper about this, but--given that there is no
"tradition" to provide the dividing line and that money is fungible, so
clever people will find ways around the restrictions--it seems both fool-
ish and impractical to do so. To a considerable extent, then, the proposal
amounts to a federal tax on the choice of mechanisms made by state and
local governments in their borrowing, which hardly seems to serve any
national purpose.
Industrial revenue bonds--and any other borrowing to finance ac-244 Dick Netzer
tivities of ordinary taxable entities (for example, industrial water pollu-
tion control) where the tax exemption accorded the interest payments on
the debt is the sole or principal element of public subsidy--provide one
exception to the conclusion that in practice sensible dividing lines will be
hard to draw and not make much sense once drawn. Such borrowing
could be eliminated by simply denying businesses any deduction for
rent or interest payments if the underlying indebtedness is tax-exempt.
That would not preclude state and local governments from finding other
subsidy devices; however, it would end the conventional device of sim-
ply passing through the interest tax exemption.11 A similar provision
could be applied to tax-exempt borrowing for single-family house mort-
gages that are not confined to households with relatively low incomes
(by making the mortgage interest not deductible on Schedule A for tax-
payers with incomes above, say, $30,000).
Of course, some would argue that the tax exemption should not
apply to the financing of any assets whose services are private goods in
the economists’ sense of the term. That position has logic but it is far
from the position in the Treasury and other proposals, which would
allow tax exemption for some bonds issued to finance the production of
private goods but deny tax exemption for others. One could also argue
that the tax exemption on borrowing ought to be eliminated entirely
because most of the subsidy "leaks" into spending for which there is no
national interest at all, such as borrowing to construct a new city office
building--permissible under the Treasury plan since the proceeds are
clearly used by no one other than the city government.
Another line of attack on tax-exempt borrowing in general is that it
is an inefficient subsidy to state-local capital spending because the Trea-
sury’s loss in tax revenue is so much greater than the value of the subsi-
dy to state and local governments. And in any case, why should the
federal government subsidize state-local capital spending, involving one
kind of input, rather than spending for operating purposes, involving
mainly labor inputs, or spending for transfer payments? The inefficiency
argument has been well explored in the literature for more than a quarter
of a century, and an obvious solution offered: the states and local gov-
ernments to issue taxable bonds, in return for a direct federal subsidy of
interest payments, set at an appropriate rate that continues the subsidy
but at a lower cost to the Treasury.12 That deal, however, is not on offer
11 Industrial development bonds per se accounted for 34 percent of all "private-pur-
pose" bonds issued in 1983 (ACIR, 1984), and over 50 percent of such borrowing in 12
states. The 1982 tax law provides that industrial development bonds will no longer be tax-
exem~t after 1986. Presumably, the transfer efficiency of tax-exempt borrowing will be improved by
the federal income tax rate structure in the Treasury plan. That is, the spread between
taxable and tax-exempt yields is likely to be closer to the (lower) marginal rates paid by
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now: the Treasury proposal on "private-purpose" bonds owes nothing to
the transfer-efficiency argument.
Public finance economists generally disapprove of subsidies direct-
ed at particular inputs in the state-local sector rather than subsidies for
outputs that are considered in the national interest (see, for example,
Zimmerman, 1984 and 1985a). If particular inputs are to be subsidized, a
case could perhaps be made for federal subsidy of borrowing costs.
Interest rates are highly volatile over time, more so than most other
input costs, and interest rates matter a lot for the financing of long-lived
assets for which most state-local borrowing is undertaken. The federal
government is the major determiner of interest rates, through its macro-
economic policy and its management of its own finances. Therefore, in
an era of high interest rates for which federal policy bears much respon-
sibility-the last 15 years or so--it maybe appropriate that the federal
government subsidize this particular input, rather than others.
The case for ending tax exemption for "private-purpose" municipal
bonds may be weak, but suppose the proposal is enacted: what will its
effects be? Gurwitz (1985) has a good summary. First, there would be a
flood of new financings to get under the wire, as happened in the last
quarter of 1984 in the face of a far less rigorous tax change. Second,
considerable ingenuity will be devoted to altering the legal arrange-
ments for the now-proscribed type of borrowing to get within the tax-
exemption net, for example by substituting direct public ownership and
operation of waste-to-energy facilities for contracts with private owners
and operators. Paradoxically for these times and this Administration,
the change will slow the move toward private provision of public
services.
Third, where it is impossible to circumvent the proscription, the
cost of capital to the beneficiaries of these types of borrowing will rise.
Fourth, there will be some reduction in the volume of tax-exempt bor-
rowing, how much depending on the precise language of the legislation,
the Treasury regulations issued pursuant to that legislation and the court
decisions subsequently, and the ability of state and local officials to find
ways around the restrictions. Gurwitz sees the reduction as "unknown
but probably substantial," industry observers see it as enormous, but it
could also be very small in the end.
Finally, whatever the decrease in the volume of tax-exempt financ-
ing, that decrease will reduce interest rates for the remaining tax-exempt
borrowing. Only a few careful estimates of the magnitude of the de-
crease are available, and they vary by a factor of more than ten to one.
(See ACIR, 1984, p. 127, and Zimmerman, 1984.) The low estimates
suggest that a 25 percent reduction in the volume of new offerings might246 Dick Netzer
reduce interest rates by as little as 1 percent (not percentage points),othe
high estimates by more than 11 percent,a3
Other Effects on the Supply of Municipals
State and local borrowers, particularly the larger, more frequent and
more aggressive borrowers (New York’s Municipal Assistance Corpora-
tion (MAC) is a prime example), often issue bonds to refund outstanding
bonds prior to the earliest date at which they can be called for redemp-
tion. This is done to smooth future debt service schedules (the usual
motive of MAC), to take advantage of lower market interest rates, or to
escape from restrictive bond indenture provisions. The original issue
remains outstanding, with the proceeds of the new issue put into escrow
to meet the scheduled interest and redemption payments on the original
issue. On the grounds that the practice results in "twice as many bonds
being outstanding as are required for a given project" (U.S. Treasury,
1984, vol. 2, p. 295) and thus increases the federal revenue loss associat-
ed with tax-exempt bonds, the Treasury proposes to limit refunding
bonds to those whose proceeds are used immediately for redemption of
outstanding bonds. The Treasury also alleges that the additional volume
of tax-exempt bonds outstanding "raises the interest rates that must be
paid to finance state and local government projects" (p. 296).
The reasoning is peculiar. It ignores the specific use of the proceeds
of the advance refunding issues: they are invested in special U.S. Trea-
sury obligations issued for this purpose, whose maturities and interest
rates precisely match those of the original issue, with those obligations
held by a trustee. That means that money is lent to the Treasury at
interest rates lower than those it must otherwise pay, thereby offsetting
most of the additional revenue loss from the greater amount of outstand-
ing tax-exempt bonds. Moreover, rational participants in the market for
municipals will not view the original issue as an ordinary tax-exempt
issue any longer, for the original issue has been in effect converted to an
issue of Treasury securities that should trade as low-coupon Treasuries,
rather than as part of the outstanding volume of obligations of the re-
funder. Therefore, the effect of advance refunding on the level of yields
on state-local obligations should be negligible.
The Treasury proposal thus seems a pointless restriction on the abil-
ity of state and local governments to minimize their borrowing costs by
13 In addition to the other criticisms of the "private-purpose" bond prohibition, it
appears that the Treasury’s estimates of the revenue gains are grossly exaggerated. A
Coopers & Lybrand study for the Public Securities Association, using plausible methods
and assumptions, finds that the cumulative revenue gain for the fiscal 1986-90 period will
be less than $2 billion, not the $13 billion the Treasury estimates. Public Securities Associ-
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adept debt management practices. If the proposal is adopted, the long-
term effect (after an initial flood of issues to beat the deadline) will be to
raise the cost of capital to municipal borrowers. They will be unable to
exploit temporary interest rate declines and likely will make sure that
future new issues, especially during periods when interest rates are
high, can be called for redemption at early dates, a provision that will
have a cost in the form of higher interest rates on the original offerings.
The overall supply effect should be relatively small, however, because
advance refunding issues (unlike "private-purpose" issues) tend to ap-
pear only when the spreads between taxable and tax-exempt issues are
large.
At one time, it was possible for state and local governments to earn
considerable amounts by borrowing at tax-exempt yields and investing
the proceeds in higher-yielding taxable securities. The current law and
Treasury regulations impose complicated restrictions on such arbitrage.
The restrictions, however, vary by type of obligation and still permit
significant arbitrage earnings under certain circumstances, so that state
and local governments still have an incentive to manage their borrowing
so as to maximize the earnings. The Treasury proposes to eliminate vir-
tually all such arbitrage. The Treasury argues that the present situation
increases the volume of tax-exempts outstanding, by encouraging bor-
rowers to issue more bonds than are necessary for a project and to issue
them sooner or keep them outstanding longer in order to maximize
reinvestment earnings, and by making economic some issues that be-
cause of high issuance costs would be uneconomic otherwise. On the
other hand, it has been argued that, because reinvestment earnings are
expected to defray part of project costs in many cases, a larger initial
issue would be required to replace those earnings. The Treasury seems
to have the better of this argument.
If deductibility of state and local taxes is eliminated, the effects on
the volume of state and local borrowing and the levels of yields will be
mixed. First, if the elimination of deductibility triggered tax rate reduc-
tions in forms analogous to Proposition 13, then the units of government
affected surely would be seen as less creditworthy. They would have to
pay higher interest rates and at worst they would not be able to borrow
at all for a time, which would reduce yields for everyone else. Second,
the combination of the ending of the federal subsidy to current tax rev-
enue and the continuation of the subsidy to borrowing would make
borrowing seem a sensible substitute to current-revenue financing.
While the two are far from complete substitutes, at the margin a good
deal is possible, such as borrowing for longer terms and borrowing rath-
er than current financing of quasi-durable assets (for example, police
cars). This too would result in higher interest rates, holding other things
constant. Third, there would be some offsetting effects on issuers in248 Dick Netzer
states with high income tax rates where the interest exemption is con-
fined to within-state issuers, as in New York, Minnesota and California.
The effective rate of state and local income taxes would be higher and
therefore the value of the interest exemption increased significantly, in-
ducing residents to replace whatever out-of-state municipals they hold
with in-state obligations.14
Conclusions on Tax-Exempt Borrowing
The effects of the full package of Treasury proposals with respect to
state and local tax-exempt borrowing--after the initial efforts to beat the
deadlines--will be a mixture of positive and negative impacts on vol-
ume of offerings and rates of interest. The lowering of marginal tax
rates and the disallowing of banks’ carrying costs will reduce demand
somewhat, while the elimination of "private-purpose" and advance re-
funding bonds will reduce supply (on the assumption that not all
"private-purpose" offerings can be legitimized by institutional changes).
On balance, it seems likely that supply will be more restricted than
demand, which should mean marginally lower interest costs on the re-
maining borrowing.
Is this desirable? Or, rather, which features of the entire package are
desirable, from the standpoint of the national interest? One thing must
be said first: the case for eliminating tax exemption entirely is stronger
than the case for any one of the Treasury proposals that are specific to tax
exemption per se. The Treasury proposals reject the former case, and
have to be assessed within the context of a substantial volume of contin-
ued tax-exempt borrowing. In that context, the restrictions on "private-
purpose" and advance refunding borrowing rate poorly, as badly-
designed and economically pointless actions that further undermine
political federalism. On the other hand, restrictions on arbitrage are in-
deed proper if there is to be tax-exempt borrowing, and the Treasury
proposal is superior to the present web of regulations. The disallowance
of banks’ carrying costs also seems an appropriate concomitant to tax
exemption of interest earnings.
Summing Up
The deductibility of state and local taxes and the exemption of inter-
est on state and local obligations are highly imperfect instruments of
federal compensation for the uneven incidence among state and local
governments of special burdens or responsibilities for the production of
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positive externalities. But then most policy instruments are far from per-
fect. Are these so imperfect that they warrant the treatment proposed in
the Treasury plan--complete elimination of deductibility and substantial
restriction of tax-exempt borrowing?
My own answer to the question, as indicated previously, is that
there is indeed a plausible case for complete elimination of the tax ex-
emption on state and local borrowing, but no persuasive case for the
major restrictions the Treasury proposes. On the other hand, with re-
spect to deductibility, the persuasive case is for restriction, not abolition.
The more ardent advocates of elimination appear convinced that the
national-interest benefits per dollar of revenue lost to the Treasury from
deductibility are close to zero, while the more outspoken defenders
sometimes read as if they believed that those benefits exceeded 100 cents
on the dollar of revenue loss. In the absence of hard fact, the debaters
rely on agreeable suppositions (of the type some leading politicians use
even when facts are at hand) about the character of the state and local
spending differentials supported by deductible taxes. The suppositions
agreeable to me suggest that the national-interest benefits per dollar of
revenue loss to the Treasury are less than 50 cents, but far above zero. So
deductibility may be a fourth-best way to generate those benefits, as
compared to a third-best set of conventionally designed federal grants
and to a second-best set of properly designed grants (say, those spelled
out by Gramlich, 1985). But neither of those superior alternatives is on
offer. The fourth-best is not an infrequent or dishonorable solution in
public life.
Of course, if one believes that domestic government is evil (except,
possibly, when it regulates private morals), then it is highly appropriate
to use the happy occasion of tax simplification for more than one pur-
pose, to shrink the size of subnationaI as well as national government.
Even for that purpose, the elimination of deductibility is a clumsy instru-
ment, but it is at hand.250 Dick Netzer
References
Aaron, Henry J., and Harvey Galper, Assessing Tax Reform, The Brookings Institution,
1985.
Bradford, David E, and Wallace E. Oates, "Suburban Exploitation of Central Cities and
Governmental Structure," in Hochman and Peterson, eds., Redistribution through Pub-
lic Choice, Columbia University Press, 1974.
Courant, Paul N., Edward M. Gramlich, and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, "The Stimulative Effects
of Intergovernmental Grants: Or Why Money Sticks Where It Hits," in Mieszkowski
and Oakland, eds., Fiscal Federalism and Grants-in-Aid, The Urban Institute, 1979.
deSeve, Charles W., and Thomas E. Vasquez, "The Impact of Changes in the Federal Tax
Code on State Tax Revenues," National Tax Journal, Vol. 37 (September 1984), pp.
393-410.
Gramlich, Edward M., "Intergovernmental Grants: A Review of the Empirical Literature,"
in Oates, editor, The Political Economy of Fiscal Federalism, Lexington Books, 1977.
Gramlich, Edward M., "Reforming U.S. Fiscal Federal Arrangements," in Quigley and
Rubinfeld, editors, American Domestic Priorities: An Economic Appraisal, University of
California Press, 1985(a).
Gramlich, Edward M., "The Deductibility of State and Local Taxes," working paper, Au-
gust 1985(b).
Gramlich, Edward M., and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, "Micro Estimates of Public Spending De-
mand Functions and Tests of the Tiebout and Median-Voter Hypotheses," Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 90, (June 1982), pp. 536-560.
Gurwitz, Aaron S., "The Potential Impact of Recent Tax Proposals on Municipal Bond
Markets," Salomon Brothers Inc, May 1985.
Hochman, Harold M., "Rule Change and Transitional Equity," in Hochman and Peterrson,
editors, Redistribution Through Public Choice, Columbia University Press, 1974.
Hulten, Charles R., "The Impact of Federal Tax Reform on State-local Governments," Janu-
ary 10, 1985, a paper prepared for the Treasury Studies of Federal-State-Local Fiscal
Relations.
Inman, Robert P., "The Fiscal Performance of Local Governments: An Interpretative Re-
view," in Mieszkowski and Straszheim, editors, Current Issues in Urban Economics,
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979.
Inman, Robert P., "Does Deductibility Influence Local Taxation?" May 1985.
Kenyon, Daphne A., "Federal Income Tax Deductibility of State and Local Taxes," March
1985, a paper prepared for the Treasury Studies of Federal-State-Local Fiscal Relations.
Netzer, Dick, "Local Alternatives to the Property Tax: User Charges and Nonproperty
Taxes," Academy for State and Local Government, 1983.
New York State Special Deputy Comptroller, "The Potential Impact of Proposed Federal
Tax Law Changes on New York City and New York State," Report 17-86, August
1985.
Noto, Nonna A., and Dennis Zimmerman, "Limiting State-Local Tax Deductibility in Ex-
change for Increased General Revenue Sharing: An Analysis of the Economic Effects,"
Congressional Research Service, June 1983 (also appeared as an August 1983 Commit-
tee Print, Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, Senate Committee on Gov-
ernmental Affairs, S. Prt. 98-77).
Noto, Nonna A., and Dennis Zimmerman, "Limiting State-Local Tax Deductibility: Effects
Among the States," National Tax Journal, Vol. 37 (December 1984), pp. 539-550.
Oakland, William H., "Consequences of the Repeal of State and Local Tax Deductibility
under the U.S. Personal Income Tax," January 1985, a paper prepared for the Treasury
Studies of Federal-State-Local Fiscal Relations.
The President’s Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity, May 1985.
Proctor, Allen J., and Julie N. Rappaport, "Federal Tax Reform and the Regional Character
of the Municipal Bond Market," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review,
Autumn 1985, pp. 6-15.
Public Securities Association, "An Analysis of Treasury Estimates of Revenue Gains from
the Proposed Elimination of Selected Tax-Exempt Securities," a report by Cooper &
Lybrand, July 1985.
Rock, Steven M., "The Impact of Deductibility on the Incidence of a General Sales Tax,"STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 251
National Tax Journal, Vol. 37 (March 1984), pp. 105-112.
Sparrow, E T., "The Subsidy Value and Incidence of Tax Expenditures Which Benefit State
and Local Governments--The Case of the Property Tax," January 9, 1985, a paper
prepared for the Treasury Studies of Federal-State-Local Fiscal Relations.
U. S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Strengthening the Federal Rev-
enue System: Implications for State and Local Taxing and Borrowing, Commission Report A-
97, October 1984.
U. S. Congressional Budget Office, Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options, Feb-
ruary 1985 (this is Part II of the CBO’s 1985 annual report on budgetary options), pp.
259-261, 291-293.
U. S. Treasury Department, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth: The
Treasury Department Report to the President (3 volumes), November 1984.
Zimmerman, Dennis, "Resource Misallocation from Interstate Tax Exportation: Estimates
of Excess Spending and Welfare Loss in a Median Voter Framework," National Tax
Journal, Vol. 36 (June 1983), pp. 183-202.
Zimmerman, Dennis, "Federal Tax Policy, IDBs and the Market for State and Local Bonds,"
National Tax Journal, Vol. 37 (September 1984), pp. 411-420.
Zimmerman, Dennis, "Treatment of State-Local Taxes and Tax-exempt Bonds under Tax
Reform Proposals: Effect on the State- Local Sector," Congressional Research Service,
Report No. 85-503 E, January 18, 1985(a).
Zimmerman, Dennis, "Tax Reform and Federal Subsidy of the State-Local Sector: Is There a
Role for State-Local Tax Deductibility?" Congressional Research Service, Report No.
85-515 E, January 28, 1985(b).
This paper was made possible in part by funds granted by the Charles H. Revson
Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely those of the author.Discussion
Edward M. Gramlich*
I have approximately the same efficiency objectives as Dick Netzer
and I agree with almost all of the technical arguments in his wide-
ranging and balanced paper. I do get to a somewhat different bottom
line, however. On deductibility of state and local taxes generally, he
favors an intermediate approach between continuation and the Trea-
sury’s proposed complete elimination. I can see an intermediate ap-
proach that is preferable to complete elimination, but it is not the one he,
or anybody else, favors. Barring that, I am with the Treasury in favoring
complete elimination. On the tax preferences for state and local borrow-
ing, he favors complete elimination, but is not impressed with the Trea-
sury’s case for partial restriction of borrowing preferences. I favor
complete elimination too, but I would take the Treasury’s partial restric-
tion measures as a second best.
In my remarks I will make a few comments on tax reform in general,
and then discuss deductibility and borrowing preferences separately. I
do not repeat Netzer’s arguments in those many cases where I agree
totally, but just jump in where I feel the weighting of various pros and
cons should be different.
Tax Reform in General
As has been said often at the conference, the worst two words in the
whole tax reform discussion are "revenue-neutral." It is as if the United
States is starting off in a position where its wealth accumulation ratio
(defined to include net exports as part of capital formation) had not
*Professor of Economics and Public Policy, University of Michigan.DISCUSSION 253
declined, and as if fiscal policy were innocent in any decline. I state
things in this awkward way to indicate that the problem I am thinking of
is the large budget deficit, but the reason I am thinking of it is not that I
fear budget deficits per se, but that I don’t like to see my generation go
on consumption binges, and we appear to be embarking on a big one.
Given this initial condition, my objective in any tax reform measure
would be to end with a substantial reduction in the budget deficit. Tax
increases do not have to cover the entire deficit, of course, but base-
broadening should be one of the first things considered in raising the
$100 billion or more required to bring fiscal policy back into balance. To
quote none other than David Stockman, it seems "preposterous" to limit
tax reform possibilities by the revenue-neutrality constraint. According-
ly, my point of view throughout will be that the country needs to cut
back fiscal policy by $100 billion or more.
Presently about $35 billion is given away by state and local tax de-
ductibility and another $20 billion by borrowing preferences. Is there
merit in these subsidies? On balance I find about zero merit, which is
less than Netzer finds, though he doesn’t find anything close to full
merit. My preference would be to get rid of the subsidies--preferably
with some adjustments to cover some social losses--but as a political
strategy I am happy to take complete elimination now and worry about
those losses some other day.
Tax Deductibility
On its surface, the deductibility of state and local taxes appears to be
one of the most pro-rich subsidies there is. The vast majority of taxpay-
ers with a taxable income over $30,000 itemize and claim this preference;
very few with a taxable income under $20,000 do so. Why then are the
conservatives proposing to kill the subsidy and the liberals so obsessed
with retaining it?
Assuming noble motives and intelligence on the part of liberals, the
answer must be some sort of a "social offset." The benefit appears to go
to the rich, but actually goes to somebody else or for some other pur-
pose. Dick comes up with three broad social offsets.
State and Local Spending
Eliminating deductibility will raise the tax price of state and local
spending and reduce it, and that is socially bad if there are benefit spill-
overs that should be paid for outside of the district. Netzer correctly (in
my view) places little stock in all this. The impact on spending should be
modest given low price elasticities and the fact that most voters do not254 Edward M. Grdmlich
itemize, and it is hard to think of many spillovers where there is not
already some categorical grant that shares the burden. I have no dis-
agreement with Netzer here, except that I place even less stock in this
argument for a reason that he mentioned but I think did not give suffi-
cient emphasis.
The problem with the argument is not merely that a minority of
voters itemize, it also involves who is doing the itemizing. In a separate
paper that Netzer had not seen when he wrote his, I used some micro
data in Michigan to try to compute, more precisely than some of the
prevailing estimates, in my humble opinion, the impact of eliminating
deductibility on median spending demands. For overall local spending, I
found a 5 percent reduction, close to the 2 percent number Netzer feels
is reasonable. But there is no reduction at all in a low-income place like
Detroit, where relatively few voters itemize, and more than a 10 percent
reduction in a high-income place like the Detroit suburbs, where most
voters itemize. What we have is a measure that helps the people in high-
income areas support their schools, which are already good, and doesn’t
help at all people in low-income areas, where schools are not good. I am
strongly opposed to such a subsidy, even if it can be shown that schools
have external benefits and that aggregate school spending will drop
when deductibility goes.
One should, of course, insert some caveats in making this argu-
ment. To the extent that states have power equalization plans that help
poor districts with their schools, some partial deductibility of state taxes
may be called for. The same is true for AFDC and Medicaid, two state-
funded programs that directly help the poor. While I would favor adjust-
ment of the matching grants supporting these programs to maintain
spending on them, I also think that these impacts are modest enough
that I would take complete elimination of deductibility even without the
offsets.
As a final point here, failure to recognize this rich community-poor
community point can lead to some pervasive mischief in attempting to
reform the tax code. I use as evidence the treatment of deductibility in
the early House Ways and Means Committee modification of Treasury II,
something not covered by Netzer. As the figure shows, taxpayers can
deduct actual state and local taxes (excluding sales taxes) up to $1000,
then $1000, and then actual taxes less 5 percent of income when that
total exceeds $1000. There would appear to be a public spending price
effect for very poor and very rich communities. (Income numbers have
been inserted in the figure, based on prevailing national averages; they
would be lower or higher in different states depending on the size of
revenues and expenditures.) But even this appearance is deceiving, be-
cause very few in low-income communities now itemize and even fewer
will, under the Ways and Means bill. Hence there will now be a priceDISCUSSION 255
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effect only in a few extremely rich communities. Over tinre, if the $1000
amount is not indexed, the price subsidy will be extended to more com-
munities, but still on the top end of the community income distribution.
What looks like a compromise between those wanting to eliminate and
those wanting to preserve deductibility then becomes a highly perverse,
almost sinister, incentive for public spending in just the richest commu-
nities-all because Congress apparently does not recognize the unholy
interaction between income stratification and itemization. I wish Netzer
had brought the point out more forcefully, and I really wish Congress
would take intercommunity equity into account in forming its deduct-
ibility provisions.
State and Local Revenues
I had thought that any social offsets here would be minor. Presently
user charges, arguably the most economically efficient state and local
revenue source, are not deductible, and other less efficient taxes are. It
would seem that putting all revenue sources on the same basis, or on a
level playing field, to use present-day jargon, would be a step in the
right direction. It still may be, but Netzer has persuaded me to be careful
with the argument. On the one hand, many user charges are not that
efficient since they have not been designed with principles of marginal
cost pricing in mind. On the other hand, we are likely to get an increase
in generally inefficient business taxes, which still remain deductible.256 Edward M. Gramlich
Netzer’s general discussion here covered all the bases and I have
little to add. However, I am left with a vague sense that he overempha-
sizes the potential inefficiencies in any new user charges imposed by
states and localities. There can’t be that much difference between aver-
age and marginal costs in the long run for a range of services such as
transportation, refuse collection, and even higher education, and in a
competitive world there can’t be that much scope for nuisance taxes on
business. Netzer makes the case for a slight social offset; my own best
guess after reading his argument is that the offset is either zero or not an
offset at all.
Migration
Here Netzer argues two new points. The first is that there could be a
reduced incentive for rich people to live in poor areas now that they no
longer get the subsidy for living in areas where their own tax prices are
high. In the paper cited above, I tried to work through all this for my
Detroit area voters, and find, with Netzer, that there is something to the
argument. Other things equal, tax prices do seem to be higher for rich
people if they live in poor areas, and they can benefit by moving if
deductibility goes. But they do not seem to benefit very much, because
the real quantity of public goods consumed is higher in the rich areas,
and the net impact is modest, again on the order of 5 percent of tax
payments. Frankly, I would doubt that many people would relocate for
fiscal differentials this small, but in the long run, who can say? In any
event, if this is a worry, the sensible way to protect against it is to retain
deductibility for low-income areas but not high-income areas. The last
point is put in just to show that I too can think up cockamamie schemes
that nobody else in the world takes seriously. As above, I would propose
it seriously if I had more confidence that such an idea would not get bent
totally out of shape in the hurly-burly of political horse trading on tax
reform plans.
Netzer’s second point here is a good one, albeit a frustrating one. It
is that whatever the social inefficiencies of deductibility, they have been
capitalized and taking them away now is horizontally inequitable. This
is, of course, an argument against any radical tax reform or expenditure
reform--really an argument that the United States should stay locked
into its consumption binge. I am so strongly opposed to that notion that
I can find lots of counterarguments. Given the publicity tax reform has
received, some reverse capitalization may have already taken place. To
maintain intergenerational horizontal equity, some present-day fiscal
subsidies must be given up, even if they are capitalized. To maintain
horizontal equity between the East and the West in this country, fiscal
subsidies must be given up simultaneously. If giving up deductibility isDISCUSSION 257
the way we get water and farm subsidies to be cut back, so much the
better. But I admit that on this one there is no very good objective
response.
My overall verdict here is that I make a negative out of Netzer’s first
offset, a zero out of his second, and I’I1 go along with part of his third.
Hence he gets positive offsets on balance and wants to restrict but not
eliminate deductibility; I get zero offsets on balance and agree with the
Treasury on eliminating deductibility.
Borrowing Preferences
The second half of Netzer’s paper involves borrowing preferences,
some of which will be attacked by the Treasury. Netzer doesn’t like the
preferences, a point on which we have no disagreement, but he doesn’t
like the attacks either. I confess to being basically out of my depth in the
world of tax arbitrage, but I do find merit in the attacks.
A recent paper by Gordon and Slemrod helps in bringing order to
this messy area by identifying several types of arbitrage. Assume a tax-
able interest rate r, an after-federal-tax interest rate r(1- t), and a state/
local nontaxable interest rate s. If these rates differ, as they will in our
present tax structure, three types of arbitrage are possible:
1. Communities can borrow at the nontaxable rate s and invest at
the higher taxable rate r. This form of blatant arbitrage is illegal, but it is
hard to know how well the Treasury enforces restrictions against it.
Netzer argues that the result of lots of shifts is that we simply cannot tell
what will happen to s relative to r, and hence to the potential of this
arbitrage loophole. He also supports the Treasury’s general attempt to
prevent this form of tax arbitrage.
But then, for reasons that were not as convincing to me, he came
out against two specific attempts to restrict it. One is the Treasury’s
attempt to end arbitrage on "private purpose" bonds by denying nontax-
able status; the other is a similar attempt to deny nontaxable status to
end arbitrage on advance refunding bonds. Netzer appears to be against
curbing private purpose bonds because they are hard to identify and any
restrictions are easily avoidable. Of course this is true, but I still think the
Treasury should step up the monitoring. Why isn’t any blockage of the
arbitrage channel, including even some uncertainty about IRS enforce-
ment, a step in the right direction?
Then Netzer criticizes curbs on advance refunding bonds because
they are invested in Treasury securities at rates lower than would other-
wise be the case. I read this as saying that the arbitrage profits on these
bonds are returned to the Treasury. If so, it is irrelevant whether the
Treasury curbs them or not. If not so, and it does take some extreme258 Edward M. Gramlich
assumptions to get all the arbitrage profits passed back to the Treasury, it
matters and the Treasury is properly trying to impose curbs. At one
extreme, therefore, the curbs are appropriate and at the other extreme
irrelevant. That sounds to me like an argument for imposing the
restrictions.
2. Communities can raise taxes at a cost of (1- t) per dollar, invest
and earn r per dollar of taxes, and give it back. Having your friendly
municipality handle your assets then avoids the tax on interest income.
Gordon and Slemrod find, seemingly to their surprise, that there is not
much of this because rich people don’t seem to trust governments to
manage their finances. Perhaps we should not take the possible arbi-
trage seriously, except that I will note that any attempt.discussed under
1) above to limit investment at r will also close down this channel. That,
in my view, is another reason for favoring the Treasury’s curbs, however
imperfect they may be. And while as I said above I am not enamored of
the large cuts in federal marginal rates dictated by the goal of revenue
neutrality, I have to admit that cutting t will curb this channel as well.
3. The remaining possibility is to trade on the difference between s,
which Netzer argues will not change, and r(1- t). Wealthy individuals
will want to borrow at r(1 - t) and invest at s, on their own account. If s is
fixed, this form of arbitrage will be cut by lower marginal tax rates, but
the arbitrage has minimal effect on states and localities. Poor communi-
ties will want to borrow at s, lower property taxes, and have their citi-
zens earn r(1 -t) on the saved property taxes. Here the relevant t is for
poor investors, and this subsidy for the poor is not changed much by the
Treasury. Here again the structure of the rate cuts looks good because it
limits the rich person’s subsidy without touching the poor person’s.
My general verdict on this part then is that what the Treasury is
trying to do is good, though in part because of the cut in top marginal
rates. I don’t see why Netzer is so ambivalent about the Treasury propos-
als, though we both should be slightly more ambivalent if I had my way
and marginal federal tax rates were not cut so much.